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Summary: The crisis in 2008 resulted in significant changes in banking regulation just as in 
all fields of economy. The business activities of the greatest banks encompass the whole 
world. It is not easy to follow these complex connections and to observe the regulations. The 
infectious effect of the systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs) may endanger 
the whole bank system. Such banks are able to drag down even the economies of the countries 
in which they operate. This is why it is important to apply more stringent regulations to banks 
than to other businesses. The Basel rules, the latest EU regulations and the bank union itself 
have been created also for this purpose. In our study, we shall present changes in the field of 
the EU bank regulation, which tends to become rule-based rather than risk-based. We discuss 
how the latest regulations shape the operation of the sector. Naturally, there are opponents to 
bank regulation. The so-called free banking means, in fact, that the regulation of the banks is 
based on the market, the managers are aware of the risks they take, and therefore they are able 
to react to the economic shocks in due time, and ultimately, they take it for granted when they 
are bailed out by the central bank which supports them. Nevertheless, bank regulation has 
been continuously developing and supplemented with new elements in the recent years. And 
experiences show that such a regulation is really necessary. 
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1. Importance of Banking Regulation in the European Union 
 
The various financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, institutional 
investors, are closely related. The banks get close to the operators of the financial life via the 
various payment systems, and therefore if a bank has liquidity problems and subsequently 
becomes insolvent (on a long term) then it will affect all institutions being in connection with 
it. This is called an infection effect when the problem causes a severe crisis in the whole 
financial system, which means that much more stringent rules should be applicable to the 
financial institutions than to traditional businesses. 
We would believe that the necessity of banking regulation is clear, however, even economic 
specialists do not agree in this matter. Many refer to the significant costs of state interventions 
which are financed from the taxpayers’ money in the case of a bankruptcy. At the same time, 
on the basis of so-called free banking, banks should operate on the basis of the regulatory 
mechanism of market, as in the case of other business, which would result in mush less costs. 
“Free banking is, in fact, a limited presence or even lack of banking regulation; money 
creation, more closely its regulation or non-regulation is decisive within regulation. This 
approach questions the necessity of central banks and is based on absolutely proper decisions 
of the banks, the full applicability of the laisser-faire principle.” (Zsolnai, 2012, p.213) 
In our opinion, the managers of the financial institutions are fully aware of the extent of the 
risks assumed by them. They know that keeping of the confidence of depositors is the most 
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important task, and therefore they spend much on protection against the occurrence of 
unfavourable events. 
The Union’s banking regulation contains guidelines and regulations. The member states have 
to transpose the guidelines into their national legal framework, while the regulations are 
mandatory for all countries. 
The banking regulation within the Union has been divided into two parts until now: 
- the regulatory level of the national authorities which regulates the operation of the 
financial institutions in accordance with the national specificities in all countries, and 
- the directives of the European Union, which are mandatory but are transposed by the 
countries into their own legal framework in accordance with the national specificities. 
The Single Rulebook is intended to change this division by providing uniform rules in each 
member states by means of regulations and standards issued by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). The Single Rulebook sets capital requirements for the banks, provides a 
higher level of protection for depositors, and helps to prevent bankruptcy situations and to 
manage bankrupted banks. From 2015, the banks must publish their data (Kiss, 2014). 
Basel III was published in 2009 and finalised in September 2010, which contains significant 
changes, in particular, in the solvency margin elements. All G20 countries recognise it as 
binding, i.e. it is created as a global standard (Szombati, 2012, p.33). The regulation 
introduces the term of leverage ratio which is the ratio of the common equity and all 
exposures. The specified value is 3%, which must be reached from 2018. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has worked out quality and quantity indexes to 
qualify the global systematically important banks (GSIBs). These banks were classified into 
five groups on the basis of their systemic risk effects, and surplus capital requirements were 
assigned to the individual categories (2.5% as the highest) the adherence to which gradually 
becomes compulsory between 2016 and 2019 (Mérő, 2011, p.8.). 
The introduction of new indexes is the greatest change, since the previous Basel directives did 
not contain requirements for the liquidity levels of the banks. 
In accordance with the first proposal, the banks have to possess liquid financial assets for at 
least 30 days. The LCR (liquidity coverage ratio) is an index necessary for its calculation. It 
was introduced in 2015, which means that 60% of the assets of the banks have to be liquid 
assets good enough to be involved in crisis management for 30 days. This value has to be 
increased by 10% per year in order to reach 100% by 2019. 
In accordance with the second proposal, the bank’s balance structure must allow independent 
operation on a long term, i.e. the permanent sources must exceed the rate of liquid sources. It 
is calculated with the NSFR (net stable funding ratio) index, and it is planned to be introduced 
in 2018. 
In the recent years, most of the rules have become less significant due to the liberalisation of 
the financial markets, globalisation, the free capital flow within the European Union. By now, 
the geographic limitation of opening of a bank has been terminated, resulting in a much less 
transparent system. The regulation tends to move from risk base regulation to rule base 
regulation in the whole world, and is supplemented with the regulation of system risks. This 
will rearrange the relations between the states and banks, the European Central Bank and 
other Union institutions as well as the member states of the euro zone and non-euro zone 
Union countries. 
 
2. Micro- and Macroprudential Regulation, System Risk in the Banking sector 
 
The necessity of micro- and mainly macroprudential regulation has an increasing priority at 
international level. The first is intended to protect the depositors and to reduce the probability 
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of occurrence of bankruptcies. While the macroprudential regulation is intended to minimise 
large scale system level risks. 
The attention to the lack of the macroprudential regulation of banks was called by the 
financial crisis. In the narrow sense, system risk means that a specific event affecting first 
only a narrow part of the economy adversely influences also other economic fields after a 
while. In its broadest sense, the event has a severe effect on several institutions and markets. 
The event is weak if no institution goes bankrupt as a result of the shock. It is strong if even 
only one institution goes bankrupt, which could not have happened without the shock 
(Lublóy, 2003, p. 78). 
There are two types of risks in the case of banks. The individual risks affect only the bank 
concerned, while the system level risk has an influence on the financial system as a whole and 
thereby also on the whole economy. Such economic operators are called Systematically 
Important Financial Institution (SIFI). 
Today, new terms appear in connection with this topic. The principle of “too big to fail” is 
replaced by the principle of “too big to save” to an increasing extent, that is the most giant 
banks are now too big to save. Banking regulation has moved into this direction. The 
economic capacities of the countries do not allow them to allocate enormous amounts to the 
saving of financial institutions and thereby to risk the stability of the country. 
The global systemically important banks (GSIB) having the largest assets in the world. Based 
on the report of November 2014 of the Financial Stability Board, 31 such banks operate 
currently in the world.There are four Chinese banks and one Japanese bank among the first 10 
ones. The first ICBC was only the 32nd on the list in 2004, and was already among the 10 best 
ones from 2006, and became the first one from 2013. Though the seat of the third largest 
HSBC Holdings is in the United Kingdom, most of its incomes come from the Asian market. 
JP Morgan Chase is the largest bank in the United States. In addition to them, the top ten 
include the French BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole and the English Barclays (Realbank, 
Economy Watch, 2014.). 
Compared to their GDPs of the countries, the European banking system is larger than the 
American one. The balance sheet totals of the large European banks are not high compared to 
the European GDP, but are enormous compared to the national incomes of their own 
countries. 
The GDPs of Chine, US and Japan are enormous, and the balance sheet totals of the banks are 
insignificant compared to these values. However, the difference between the assets of the 
largest European banks and the GDPs of their home countries is not so significant at all. 
In 2014 the English HSBC Holdings was the greatest bank in Europe. The 8th largest bank, 
Banco Santander had assets exceeding the GDP of Spain. 
Among the 10 largest European banks, 4 are located in the United Kingdom, 4 inFrance, 1 
inGermany and 1 inSpain. In 2014, the balance sheet totals of all banks exceeded 50% of the 
GDPs of the countries where they had their seats, and 7 banks had assets exceeding 10% of 
the GDP of the EU (Realbank, Economy Watch, 2014.). 
It is still not clear for the decision makers of the EU what will happen to those TBTF banks 
that are two big to save. The separation of the classical and commercial activities of the banks 
has been recommended to solve this problem, on which discussions are being held. 
 
3. New Regulatory Framework: the European Bank Union 
 
The bank union is part of an integrated financial framework, and is also a response to the 
financial and economic crisis, which was specified when it became clear that an intensive 
reform was needed to eliminate the regulatory and supervisory deficiencies. The bank union is 
based on three pillars. 
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The single supervisory mechanism (SSM) considered the first pillar of the bank union was 
assigned to the scope of the European Central Bank form 1 November 2014. It means, in fact, 
the supervision over commercial banks belonging to the euro zone is assigned to the scope of 
the ECB. This means currently 124 banks and more than 80% of the assets. Banks managing 
financial assets above 30 billion euro or having assets above 20% of their country’s GDP are 
under control. Based the Union's stress test made in October 2014, OTP Bank meets this 
condition in Hungary. In 2014, 76% of the bank deposits available in the European Union 
were owned by banks seated in the euro zone, and this is one of the reasons a more intensive 
supervision is reasonable (EBF, 2014, p.18.). 
The second pillar, the single resolution mechanism means, in fact, that banks close to 
bankruptcy are not saved from the money of taxpayers, but the responsibility must be 
assumed by their shareholders and creditors. The single resolution panel on which the single 
resolution mechanism (SRM) is based started to operate in Brussels on 1 January 2015. In all 
Union countries, national resolutions funds have to be created, and from January 2016, these 
will be replaced with a single restoration fund, and from that time the banks will pay 1% of 
the secured deposits into it. The estimated amount of the paid contributions will be EUR 55 
billion by the end of the period, i.e. 2022, or even higher if non-euro zone countries also join 
meanwhile. 
The deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) is an important element of the bank union, since with its 
rules it may contribute to the restoration of the confidence of depositors in the financial 
institutions. In April 2014, the latest decision on the regulation of the third pillar was made, 
which must be transposed by the member states into their practice by 3 July 2015. It is a new 
element that the credit institutions must pay a fee on deposits subject to compensation 
obligation by 31 December preceding the subject year. Bonds and deposit certificates issued 
by the credit institutions are removed from elements protected by deposit guarantors, but from 
now a compensation limit of EUR 100,000 is applicable to community deposits, and local 
governments with budgets less than EUR 500,000 are protected by deposit guarantors. Now, 
20 banking days are available for payments, but in accordance with the Union’s requirements, 
this period must be gradually limited to 7 banking days until 2024. 
Currently 19 euro zone countries are members of the bank union. The remaining 9 countries 
have different opinions on joining. Since the idea of the single supervision, Great Britain has 
been emphasising that they do not want to expose their banks to control by the ECB due to its 
special situation in the financial sector. Sweden has a similar viewpoint. 3 Union countries, 
Denmark, Romania and Bulgaria are for joining, but have not yet indicated their intention. 
Our country, the Czech Republic, Poland and Croatia joining in 2015 are currently waiting. 
The formation of the system has been preceded by a long process, as nearly 8 years have 
passed since the crisis. The bank union will surely be in the focus of discussions between the 
decision-makers for a long time, as certain rules will be introduced with periods of grace, and 
the EU countries will gradually join, i.e. the final formation of the bank union will last for 
several years. Though none of the countries wants it, but the operability of the system could 
possibly be evaluated and really studied in another crisis. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The quantitative regulation characteristic of the 70s has been replaced with risk based 
approaches by now, i.e. the economic importance of the banks depends not only on the 
volume of deposits but also on the risks entailed by them. 
Safe operation of the banks is in the interest of all operators of economy. Prudent operation is 
important due to the increase of deposits primarily from the aspect of the inhabitants, which 
finally affects consumption, production and ultimately the economy as a whole. 
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The major problem with state assistance is that they use the money of taxpayers to bail out 
banks instead of spending money on the creation of proper protection systems and using the 
money first of all of shareholders and creditors to solve the problem. Today, large banks 
expect the state to bail them out, and therefore they are inclined to invest the savings of 
people in assets involving high risks. This way of thinking endangers the operation on the 
economy. The crisis of 2008 has called the attention to the deficiencies in the banking 
regulation and to the resulting problems. Due to the complexity of connections and to the risk 
of any negative consequence’s becoming an international one, it is difficult but indispensible 
to find a proper solution which may result even in additional expansion of banking regulation 
at international level. 
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